Clarence B. Lambert v. Jerry Sine and Dora Sine : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1950
Clarence B. Lambert v. Jerry Sine and Dora Sine :
Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richards and Bird; Dan S. Bushnell; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation





State of Utah 
CLARENCE B. LAMBERT, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
JERRY SINE and DORA SINE, do-
ing business under the name and 
style of Se Rancho Motor Lodge 
and Tourist Apartments, 
A ppellwnts. 
No. 7572 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
~ D::ICHARDS AND BIRD 
1:;' \ L ~ . DANS. BUSHNELL 
l' , .... : 2 0 \~J 0 Attorneys for Appellants \'{ u \j . • •••• --... 
~~~~~~· •. ta\l ----~--~~~~~c~ urt, u 
---- rgpe 0 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................ 1 
~TATEMENT OF POINTS .................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 5 
POINT I.-The Relation of the Appellants to the Re-
spondent was that of Innkeeper and Guest........................ 5 
POINT 11.-It was Error to Award Damages for Mental 
Anguish and Humiliation where there was no Will-
ful or Malicious Wrong and no Award of Actual 
Damages ----------------------------·-·---··················-·······--·--·-·····-----········· 18 
POINT 111.-The Appellant's Motion to Dismiss at the 
Close of the Plaintiff's Case Should Have Been 
Granted --·-·····----------------·--·-·------·---------········································· 23 
POINT IV.-The amount of Damages Awarded Was Ex-
·cessive --------····-----·················-----: .................................................. 25 
CONCLUSION ·----··----------------·····------------··················-------···-······--······--···-····· 31 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Bradford v. Mangano (La. 1942), 6 So. 2d 16 .................................... 30 
Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P. 2d 100, 154 ALR 167 .... 5. 15 
Burford v. Crause (D. C. 1950), 89 Fed. Supp. 818 ............................ 16, 20 
Cochrane v. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361 ................................................................ 20 
Coggins v. Gregorio (10 Cir.), 97 F. 2d 948 ............................................ 5 
De War v. Minnesota Lodge No. 44, B. P. O.E., 155 Minn. 
98, 192 N.W. 358, 32 ALR 1012 ----·····------------··································· 5 
Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 P. 856, 12 
ALR 255 ................................................................................................ 10 
Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P. 2d 33 ........................................ 16 
Holmes v. Di Leo (La. 1938), 184 So. 356 ............................................ 30 
Marden v. Radford, 229 Mo. App. 789, 84 S.W. 2d 947 ............ 8, 9, 10, 11 
Michels v. Borna (Texas), 122 S.W. 2d 216 ............................................ 22 
Noblit v. Blickshire Hotels and Motels, 93 Cal. App. 2d 864 
210 P. 2d 43 ----··-····················------················-·-········---------·················-· 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P. 2d 903 .................................... 5 
Rammell v. Bulan (Ohio 1948), 80 N.E. 2d 167 .................................... 30 
Roberts v. Casey, 36 Gal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 93 P. 2d 654 ........ o, 6, 15 
Robinson v. Bonhaye (La. 1940), 195 So. 365 ........................................ 29 
Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E. 2d 672 ............................ 21 
Vaughn v. Neal (D. C.), 60 Atl. 2d 234 ................................................ 10 
* * * * * 
12 ALR 261 .................................................................................................... 11 
15 Am. Jur. 598, Damages, Sec. 181 ...................................................... 19 
28 Am. Jur. 553, Innkeepers, Sec. 23 .................................................. 13 
3 Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed .................................... . 
Sec. 1076 -----------------····-·--····················-···············-······-···--··-···--·-·············5, 6 
·Sec. 1061 ................................................................................................ 8 
32 C. J. 538, Innkeeper, Sec. 18 ................................................................ 13 
2.5 C. J. S. 551, Damages :~! 
Sec. 64 .................................................................................................... 19 
Sec. 68 ----~----------------------------------------------------------···········-············-········---- 19 ili[ 
43 C. J. S. 1138, Innkeepers, See 3 ............................................................ 13 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
Title 52, Chapter 2, Sec. 2 ................................................................ 16 
Title 52, Chapter 3, Sec. 1 ................................................................ 16 
Title 104, Chapter 60, Sec. 3 (2) ........................................................ 17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




State of Utah 
CLAREXCE B. LAMBERT, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
JERRY SINE and DORA SINE, do-
ing business under the name and 
style of Se Rancho Motor Lodge 
and Tourist Apartments, 
Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ST.A.TE~fENT OF FACTS 
No. 7572 
This action was commenced by the respondent for an 
unlawful eviction and conversion of personal property. 
The action was not based upon the forceful entry and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
detainer statute, nor did it seek recovery of possession, 
but rather was an action for damages only. (Tr. 1, 2). 
The controversy arose out of the following circum-
stances: 
On January 2, 1950, the respondent, his brother 
Charles, and Dan Moore negotiated with Mrs. Sine, one 
of the appellants and joint owner of Se Rancho Motor 
Lodge in Salt Lake City for the hire of one of the motel 
units. (Tr. 15, 38, 51). After some discussion of the 
terms and the nature of the units available, it was <le-
cided that unit No. 107 (Tr. 16, 39, 51) would be occu-
pied by the boys at the rate of $21.00 per week in advance, 
(Tr. 48, 49, 60) payable bi-weekly,. which pay period 
corresponded closely to the pay period of one of the boys. 
(Tr. 45, 49). The three boys signed the "Guest Regis-
tration'' card, (Exhibit 1) and moved into the unit. (Tr. 
30). 
Unit No. 107 consisted of three furnished rooms and 
a hath. (Tr.18). r:ewo rooms were bedrooms with double 
beds and the third roon1 was a small kitchen or kitchen-
ette. (Tr. 18). Linens, heat, light, water, and telephone 
service were furnished to the occupants, ('Tr. 21, 22, 86), 
and some housecleaning service was performed, ( Tr. 103, 
104) as well as maintenance service. (Tr. 24, 25, 70-72). 
Garbage service and facilities were available to the oc-
cupants. ( Tr. 2i3, 87). The boys furnished their own 
cooking utensils and dishes, etc. (Tr. 33). 
Under this arrangement the three boys 1ived at the 
motel until the ea:dy part of l\f areh 1950, at which time 
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two of the boys n1oved out, (Tr. 25) leaving· the plaintiff 
alone living in the unit. On or about -March 13th, the 
boys were in arrears on their payments for two weeks 
and owed $10.93 for telephone calls. The telephone serv-
ice had been discontinued in early February for the fail-
ure to pay the bill for the same. (Tr. 33). 
Prior to :March 15th one or more discussions were 
had between the respondent and ~Irs. Sine regarding the 
delinquent payn1ents. ( Tr. 62, 105). In each case the 
respondent pron1ised to make a payment within a short 
period, but failed to do so. On ~Iarch 15th the locks on 
the doors were changed. (Tr. 54). \Yhen the plaintiff 
returned he could not get into his apartment and inquired 
at the office. (Tr. 54, 107). He was inforrned that he 
was locked out for non-payment of his bill. Seventy-three 
dollars was claimed to be due, including the week com-
mencing on :March 13th and the telephone bill. The re-
spondent claimed the bill was excessive and left the motel. 
(Tr. 54, 55). The next morning he was permitted to se-
cure his work clothes from the unit. (Tr. 57, 89, 108). On 
:\Iarch 17th the respondent claims to have tendered an 
amount between $50 and $60 as payment in full. (Tr. 
58). 
The tenant~' was never resumed and at a later time 
all but a fe\v of the better items of clothing were re-
leased to the respondent, the balance being retained as 
sreu rity for a lien for the payments due. ( Tr. 108, 109). 
rrhe respondent brought this action to recover $1,000 
damages for wrongful dispossession, for $200 for con-
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version of personal property, and for $1,000 punitive 
damages. (Tr. 1, 2). 'The appellants counterclaimed for 
the unpaid rent and telephone bill. (Tr. 3). The court 
found for the respondent on the wrongful dispossession 
and allowed $250.00 damages for mental anguish and 
suffering; no amount was awarded as actual damages. 
(Tr. 8). The court found that the appellants had not 
acted maliciously and granted the counterclaim in the 
sum of $64.96. (Tr. 8, 9). It was further held that the 
appellants properly had a lien on the personal property 
for the upaid charges. (Tr.126). 
STA 'TE~fEXT OF POINTS 
I. 
THE RELATION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THERE-
SPONDENT WAS THAT OF INNKEEPER AND GUEST. 
II. 
IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR MENTAL 
ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION WHERE THERE WAS NO 
WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS WRONG AND NO AWARD OF 
ACTUAL DAMAGES. 
III. 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GRANTED. 
IV. 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS EX-
CESSIVE. 
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ARGt:~fEXT 
I. 
THE RELATION OF THE APPELLANTS TO THE RE-
SPONDENT WAS THAT OF INNKEEPER AND GUEST. 
If the dispossession be wrongful it must he on the 
basis that the relation between the parties was that of 
landlord and tenant, rather than innkeeper and guest. If 
the relation was that of landlord and tenant, the appel-
lants should have resorted to the statutory remedy of 
unla-wful detainer. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 
150 P. 2d 100, 15-1 A.L.R. 167; Paxton v Fisher, 86 Utah 
408, -15 P. 2d 903. If the relation was that of innkeeper 
and guest, no notice need be given. Roberts v. Casey 36 
Cal. App. 2d Supp. 767, 93 P. 2d 654; De War v. Minne-
sota Lodge N" o. 4-1, B.P.O.E., 155 ~finn. 98, 192 N.W. 358, 
32 A.L.R. 1012. Nor can the guest maintain an action for 
ejectment or trespass. 3 Thompson on Real Property, 
Perm. Ed., Sec. 1076. 
The principal distinction between the landlord and 
tenant relationship and that of innkeeper and guest is 
that the tenant acquires an interest in the real estate and 
has the exclusive possession of the leased premises, while 
the lodger acquires no estah~ and has merely the use wit~­
out the actual or exclusive possession. Coggins v. 
Gregorio (10 Cir.), 97 F. 2d 948, 950. The distinction is 
stated in 3 Thompson on Real Property, Perm., Ed., Sec. 
1076, as follows: 
''The chief distinction betwPen a tenant anrl 
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lodger rests in the character of possession; the 
'tenant' having exclusive legal possessron of the 
premises and being responsible for the care and 
condition thereof, and the 'lodger' having merely 
the right to the use of the premises; the landlord 
retaining control and the right of access to the 
premises.'' 
The controlling factor 1n determining the relation is 
the intention of the parties derived from the contract and 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. The 
character of the relation being a mixed question of law 
and fact. Roberts v. Casey, supra; 3 Thompson on Real 
Property, Perm. Ed., Sec. 1076. 
The circumstances to be considered in determining 
the relation are discussed in Roberts v. Casey, supra, as 
follows: 
''In the instant case the circumstances al-
ready alluded to, that the plaintiffs at all times re-
tained keys to all of the apartments and had 
regular access to them for caretaking purposes, 
furnished the linen and caused it to be laundered, 
furnished regular maid service and caused the 
beds to be changed and in some of the apartment~, 
though perha;ps not in those of appellants, to be 
made every day as well, kept not only the hall-
ways but also the carpets and windows in the 
apartment:-: themselves clean, and attended to the 
removal of garbage, as well as furnishing light, 
water, heat and telephone service, are matters 
tending as far as they go to show the relation of 
the partie:; to h[lxe been that of proprietors and 
lodgers rather than landlords and tenants. Fox 
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v. 'Yinden1ere Hotel A pt. Co .• 30 Cal. A pp. 162, 
164. 165, 157 P. 820. 
"On the other hand, it is true, as we also ~a w 
that there were. on the pren1ises, no con1mon 
kitchens, dining rooms. toilets or bathrooms; that 
the suites had severally these various facilities; 
that each suite was, in some sort, a distinct unit, 
and that the rent for a suite was the same without 
regard to the number of occupants. These cir-
cumstances tended, so far as they went, to char-
acterize the relations between respondents and ap-
pellants as those of landlords and tenants. Fox v. 
'Yinden1ere Hotel Apt. Co., 30 Cal. App. 162, 164, 
1-- p --, 1 ') ( 6""8) '' <)I • ~:....~ . page t:> • 
After considering the factors just discussed, the Cali-
fornia court held that the relation was that of proprietor 
and lodger. In this case the proprietor had removed, 
without notice, the doors from the lodger's apartment. 
The controlling circumstances in the present case are 
as follows: 
1. THE COXTRACT. 
In this case, the contract, Exhibit 1, is entitled, 
''Guest Registration.'' One of the occupants testified that 
at the time of signing the guest registration card he 
understood what was meant by the word ''guest.'' His 
testimony is as follows : 
'' Q. Do you know the difference between a 
'guest' and a 'tenant'~ 
''A. Yes. 
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'' Q. What is the difference~ 
''A. Well, a guest is just there for a short 
time, and a tenant is there permanently. 
"Q. Were you aware of that at the time you 
engaged this unit~ 
"A. Yes." (Tr. 31). 
2. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE. 
H. Sharon Woodcock testified that he was the main-
tenance man for the appellants and that during the re-
spondent's occupancy he had to adjust the heating 
mechanism and repaired a chair used in the unit. (Tr. 
24, 25, 70-72). In :Marden v. Radford, 229 :Mo. App. 789, 
84 S.W. 2d 947 the court stated: 
''That the defendant considered himself 
obliged, under plaintiff's occupancy, to keep the 
apartment in a reasonable state of repair for 
plaintiff's habitation and to make repair of furni-
ture and fixtures therein necessarily negatives the 
idea of the relationship of landlord and tenant. 
No such obligation is imposed under such relation-
ship in the absence of a contract so to do." (page 
958). 
See also 3 Thompson on Real Property, Perm. Ed. 
Sec. 1561. 
3. l\fAID SERYI CE. 
No maid service in the usual meaning was rendered; 
however, :Mrs. Sine testified she scrubbed the floor on 
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one occasion (Tr. 103) and sent the 111aid in a eouple of 
times to straighten things up and once to do house clean-
ing such as washing down the whole bathroom and 
kitchen walls ete. (Tr. 104). All of this is definitely in-
consistent with a landlord and tenant relation. 
4. Fl-;-RXITrHE A~D FlXTFRES. 
All of the furniture was supplied by the appellants 
as well as clean linens. A mop, mop pail and broom were 
likewise furnished by the appellants. (Tr. 18, 22, 44, 
80, 81, 82). 
5. UTILITI E;-o;. 
There is no dispute but what the appellants fur-
nished the heat, light, water, and telephone service and 
that, when the telephone bill had not been paid they with-
drew this service from the respondent. (Tr. 21, 86, 87). 
Concerning these factors, the case of :Marden v. Radford, 
supra, states as follows: 
''Likewise, the evidence tending to show the 
control retained by defendant over the electricity, 
gas, water, light, heat, and telephone service 
through his complete control of the means by . 
which such were communicated to and furnished 
plaintiff in her apartment and by which he could 
deprive plaintiff and her apartment of such with-
out consulting her or without her consent might 
give grounds for an inference that defendant had 
not parted with the entire possession and control 
of such apartment to the plaintiff, but that, upon 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
the other hand, he had retained a measure of con-
trol thereof through such instrumentalities and 
was actually asserting such control.'' (page 
957). 
6. GARBAGE DISPOSAL. 
The occupants testified that for the first week the 
garbage was picked up by a motel employee, and the 
remainder of the time the boys put their garbage in 
receptacles supplied by the motel. (Tr. 23). The motel 
had the garbage disposed of by a private carrier. (Tr. 
B7). 
7. PASS KEYS. 
Both Mr. Woodcock (Tr. 72) and Mrs. Sine (Tr. 
103) testified that they had pass keys to the unit and 
used them. One of the boys testified that he supposed 
the appellants had pass keys to the unit. (Tr. 24). 
8. KITCHEN FACILITIES. 
The presence of kitchen facilities does not negative 
or prevent the existence of an innkeeper and guest re-
lationship. :Marden v. Radford, supra, Vaughn v. Neal 
(D.C.), ·60 Atl. 2d :2:14. 
9. FREQUEKCY OF PAY:.\fENTS. 
The length of time and the periods of payments are 
not controlling factors in determining the relation. In 
Fisher v. Bonneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 P. 856, 
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12 ~-\..L.R. 2:)3, th~ Utah Supren1e Court ~taterl as follow~: 
"If a person goes into an inn as a wayfarPr 
and a traveler. and the innkee·per receives hin1 as 
such, he becmnes the innkeeper's guest, and the rP-
lation of landlord and guest is instantly estab-
lished betw~en then1. K either the length of time 
that a man remains at an inn nor any agreement 
that he may make as to the price of board per day, 
depriYe~ him of his character as a traveler and 
a guest. provided he retains his status of traveler 
in other respects.'' 
In this ca~e. a Ftah legislator registered at the Newhouse 
Hotel and secured a monthly rate for the period while 
he was attending the legislature. See, also, the annota-
- tion following the case appearing at 12 A.L.R. 261, Re-
lationship of Innkeeper and Guest as Affected by Pay-
ment of Accommodations by Week, Month, or the Like. 
· Generally speaking, a weekly payment is an incident of 
a guest relationship. 
10. PERIOD OF OCCePAXCY. 
The period of occupancy also does not negative the 
relationship of an innkeeper and guest. In Marden v. 
Radford, supra, it is stated: 
·'Neither does the fact that the plaintiff may 
have been occupying the apartment in question 
under conditions of pern1anancy as a homP for the 
timP being preclude her from being a lodger.'' 
(page 0;)7). 
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11. NATURE OF S:TAY. 
An important factor is whether the occupants are 
establishing a home or a transient residence or stopping 
place. The arrangement made here was temporary as to 
each of the boys and was in no sense a home or perman-
ent residence. Clarence Lambert lived at his mother's 
home before and after his sojourn at theSe Rancho. (Tr. 
50, 58, 59). He testified that about the time he was locked 
out, he was planning, anyway, to seek "other lodging." 
(Tr. ;>2). 
Charles Lambert likewise lived at the family home 
before and after living at the Se Rancho. (Tr. 13, 1-l:, 
25, 26, 28). He had been married and a divorce action 
was pending during this interlude. (Tr. 27). 
The mother of the Lambert boys had given up her 
home and was living with her husband in \Vendover 
during the tin1e the boys were living at the Se Rancho. 
( Tr. 25, 26, 27). Charles left the motor court voluntarily 
when his mother resumed housekeeping again at their 
nome in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 27). 
The boys were both young. ( ~r rs. Sine refers to 
them as "boys." ( Tr. 100, 101, 102). Their mother called 
them when she ""'as in town and Charles was drawing 
unemployment pa~· temporarily. (Tr. 22). 
Don 1\foore had been living in \Yendover but a di-
vorce action was pending while he lived at the Se Rancho. 
(Tr. 42, 43). He had been a roomer in his brother's house 
before he rnoved in with these boys ( Tr. 38, 43, 44), and 
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upon leaving the motor court voluntarily on :\larch l~t, 
he moved home with his mother. ·(Tr. -1-1). 
Thus, it appears that all of the hoy~ were seeking 
temporary residence and not a hon1e and that they were 
transients, lodgers, or roomers. As to the significance 
of this factor see: -13 C.J.S. 1138, Innkeepers, Sec. 3; 32 
C.J. 538, Innkeepers, Sec. 18, 28 Am. Jur. 553, Inn-
keepers, Sec. 2:1. 
In determining the legal status of the parties in 
their relations with each other, it is recognized that the 
resnlt cannot be said to depend on any one factor as being 
decisive. It is, rather, a question of which direction the 
general effect of the various tests which have been ap-
plied, after weighing opposing ones against each other, 
can be said to take. It is not a question of what the re-
lation would be if considered in some isolated aspect, but 
rather, what is its dominant character. This determina-
tion, as it has been pointed out, is a mixed question of law 
and fact. In this case there is little dispute as to the 
factual issues, and after looking at all of the various 
factors, it is clear that the dominant character of the re-
lation was that of an innkeeper and guest. 
In a recent California case, N oblit v. Blickshire 
Hotels and l\fotels, 93 Cal. App. 2d 864, 210 P. 2d 43, the 
plaintiffs occupied a motel cottage, No. F -9, consisting 
of three furnished rooms, and ren1ained there for ap-
proximately three years. The charge for the occupancy 
was at the rate of $19.50 per week. The plaintiffs left 
the auto court on a vacation, without paying the rent for 
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14 
the use and occupancy of the cottage. While they were 
away, the defendants broke the lock and entered the 
premises and removed and stored the plaintiff's prop'" 
erty. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover 
damages for conversion and forceful entry. Judgment 
was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the sum of 
$753.49, and the defendants appealed. After outlining 
the above facts, the remainder of the court's opinion I ~r 
is as follows: 
''This is the sole question necessary for us w 
to determine : 
"Do the foregoing findings disclose any ~~ 
actionable wrong committed by defendants? , ~1 
''This question must be answered in the nega. 
tive. The trial court expresRly found that in re-
moving the lock from the rooms occupied by plain- :1r 
tiffs and storing their personal property in a 
storeroom such actions 'were with cause and for 
the reason that plaintiffs had refused and con-
tinued to refuse to pay the lawful charge for the 
occupancy of said cottage' and that the acti'Ons 
of defendants were not willful or malicious. 
''Clearly if the actions of defendants were 
with cause and neither willful nor malicious plain-
tiffs have failed to establish a cause of action. A 
judgment should have been ordered for defend-
ants. 
''The judgment is reversed with directions to 
the trial court to enter judgment in favor of de-
fendants.'' ''rr 
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In Roberts v. Casey, supra, the owner of the Riviera 
Apartment Hotel removed the door to the apartment and 
all moveable furniture and bedding, for the reason that 
the occupants were in arrears on their rent. The occu-
pants, however, did not vacate the premises and a force-
ful detainer action was commenced. In this case the 
owner of the apartment hotel retained keys to all of the 
apartments, furnished linen and maid service, washed 
the windows, attended to the removal of garbage, and 
furnished light, water, heat, and telephone service. The 
apartments rented were individual units, having kitchens, 
dining rooms. hathrooms, and other facilities making the 
apartment a distinct unit, and was rented as a suite., 
without regard to the numher of occupants. Under these 
circumstances, the court held that the relation was one 
of proprietors and lodgers, rather than landlord and 
tenants. The court further stated: 
'' \\' e conclude, therefore, that so soon as a 
guest or lodger has either by default in making 
payments due or otherwise, breached his contract 
he may by appropriate proceedings be ousted 
without the requirement of any advance notice. 
His actual right to remain having ceased, his 
continued presence amounts to little more than a 
trespass and, as said in Gladwin v. Stebbins, 2 Cal. 
103, 105, 'it would be absurb, in such a case, to 
require either a denmnd, or notice to quit.' '' 
A~ was recognized in Buchanan v. Crites, supra, at 
eomnwn law the landlord had the right to dispossess a 
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tenant by force. In that case the court recognized that 
there was split of authority as to whether the Forceful 
Entry and Detainer statutes did away with this common-
law right. The court then concluded that the common-
law right was abolished in Utah by virtue of the statute. 
Some courts, without abolishing the right altogether, still 
permit peaceful dispossession but do not permit the use 
of force, which might tend to create a breach of the peace. 
Burford v. Crause (D.C. 1950), 89 Fed. Supp. 818. 'ri 
If it is concluded that a motel operator tmder these 
circumstances is a landlord, he cannot even peacefully 
retake possess~on, nor does he have an innkeeper's lien 
as created by 52-3-1, 1943 Utah Code Annotated; he is, 
in fact, in the position of being virtually without a 
remedy. An occupant can then rent by the week for an 
indefinite period and agree to pay in advance. If, how- :et 
ev'er, he fails to pay in advance, the motel operator must 
then serve notice to vacate and bring an unlawful de- 'l 
tainer action. If, in the meantime, the occupant desires to l.'lt 
remove his few personal belongings and leave, there 
is nothing the motel operator can do. The lessor's lien, 
as granted in 52-3-1, only applies to unexempt personal 
property, which would not likely be in the possession of 
a motel occupant. 'rhe innkeeper's lien, 52-2-2, 1943 Utah 
Code Annotated, applies to all personal property, but 
this lien is not aYailable to the motel operator once it is 
determined that the relation is one of landlord and ten-
ant. Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P. 2d 33. 
In the case now under consideration, the respondent 
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owed two weeks' and two days' rent and a telephone 
bill (Tr. 64), two of his friends had already morved out 
('Tr. 52), and he had told the appellants he intended to 
move out in about a week. (Tr. 52). Respondent re-
peatedly pronused to pay the rent and had failed to do 
so. ·(Tr. 105, 106). Yet, under the holding of the trial 
court that the relation was that of landlord and tenant, 
the appellants would be without a practical remedy. The 
precarious situation of the motel operator must have 
been realized by the trial judge who, although he would 
not recognize the right of the appellants to peacefully 
dispossess the respondent, did give to the appellants 
the benefit of the innkeeper's lien. The court by so doing 
inconsistently held in one instance that the relation was 
that of landlord and tenant, and in the other, that the 
relation was that of innkeeper and lodger. 
Another fact is persuasive. Utah statutes provide 
for terminating landlord-tenant relationships only under 
Chapter 60, Title 104, of the Code. Assume a weekly 
occupancy by a person not desirable. If the undesirable 
pays the fees required, the landlord could not evict him 
without a full fifteen days' notice prior to the end of the 
term, under 104-60-3(2), U. C. A., 1943, which is Inore 
than two full terms. This statute as a practical matte-r 
requires that a weekly rental period be not considPred a 
landlord-tenant relationship. 
All of the factors considered and the general policy 
involved in this case are more consistent with the holding 
of the court that the relation was that of innkeeper and 
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guest, and for this reas·on the other holding, that the re-
lation was that of landlord and tenant, should be set 
aside. 
II. 
IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD DAMAGES FOR MENTAL 
ANGUISH AND HUMILIATION WHERE THERE WAS NO 
WILLFUL OR MALICIOUS WRONG AND NO AWARD OF 
ACTUAL DAMAGES. 
The -court's eighth and tenth findings of faet are as .'1 
follows: 
'' 8. The court further finds that the un-
lawful actions of the defendants caused the plain-
tiff great mental anguish and suffering and that 
he was greatly embarrassed and humiliated, to 
his damage in the sum of $250.00.'' 
"10. The court finds that the defendants' 
acts were not malicious.'' 
Assuming for the purpose of this discussion that 
the relation between parties was that of landlord and 
tenant and that the appellants wrongfully locked the 
respondent out of his motel unit, the judgment still can 
not be supporte<l. It is a general rule that mental pain 
and suffering do not alone constitute a suffi-cient basis 
for recovery of suhstantial dmnages. Certain exceptions 
to this rule are recognized, such as a breach of contract 
to marry, certain wilful wrongs, especially those affpet-
ing the liberty of personal security, and those eases 
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affecting character reputation or domestic relations. 25 
C. J. S. 551, Damages, Se.c. 64. 
In this case no dan1age was awarded the respondent, 
other than the an1ount granted by finding of fact number 
eight. Xo case has been located where an award of this 
nature has been allowed, except where it is an incident 
of some actual damage, usually arising out of a violation 
of a personal right rather than an injury to a property 
right. In fact, the general rule, as stated in Corpus Juris 
Secondlun and .. American Jurisprudence, is as follows: 
·'In the absence of fraud, malice, or the like, 
mental anguish suffered in connection with an in-
jury to property is not an element of damage." 
25 C .J .S. 555, Dan})ages, Sec. 68. 
"Ordinary injury to the feelings is not a 
proper element of damages in action for injury to 
property, for its unlawful seizure or detention, 
or for trespass committed thereon. The contrary 
is true, however where the injury is inflicted will-
fully or maliciously or with circumstances of ag-
gravation or a manifest disregard of the injured 
party's rights, provided, of course, the ordinary 
and natural consequences of the act complained 
of would be to cause an injury to the feeling * * * 
Son1e courts hold that the doctrine of mental 
anguish is never applicable in such cases, hut that 
if the act is accomplj~·dJPd hy circumstances of ag-
gravation, the plaintiff's remedy is by the re-
covery of exemplar~, damages." 15 Am. Jur. 598, 
/Jruna,r;es, See. 181. 
~ o Utah ea~e has been found contrary to the above 
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general rules, although there are two Utah cases which 
allow, as an incident to a wrongful eviction, damages for 
mental suffering where the eviction was wrongful and 
malicious and wheer other circumstances of aggravation 
were present. In one case the court stated that the award 
could he supported on the alternative theory of exem-
plary damages. 
In Burford v. Crause (March 1950), 89 F. Sup. 818, 
the landlord, after the expiration of the tenant's term, 
finally broke the lock on the premises and removed and 
stored the tenant's possessions. The action by the tenant 
was not for possession but for wrongful eviction causing 
damages to his credit reputation, humiliation among his 
business associa tPs, and loss of income. The court held: 
''Taking these matters in their inverse order, 
the court finds as a fact that there was no showing 
of any da1i1ages. The plaintiff was unable to point 
to a single loss of a customer or credit standing, 
and testified merely to the fact that he was per-
sonally embarrassed under the mistaken appre-
hension that others might think he was being un-
lawfully evicted for failure to pay rent. Such 
proof does not amount to a showing of legal 
damages compensible under the law, nor is he ·i: 
entitled to punitive da1nages." (p. 819). 
In Cochrane v. Tuttle, 75 Ill. 361, the plaintiff moved 
into the defendant's house and occupied part of the 
rooms, cared for the defendant and his family, and took 
in other boarders. The defendant terminated the re-
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lationship, locked the plaintiff out, and offered to return 
all personal belongings to the plaintiff. At the trial a 
verdict in the sum of $1,250 was returned for the plain-
tiff. On appeal the court held that it was doubtful if 
there was a landlord and tenant relation but, even so, 
the damages Rwarded were excessive, and stated as 
follows: 
· · "\Ye do not see how the judgment can be per-
nlitted to stand. The amount found by the jury 
i~ out of all proportion to any injury inflicted, 
even upon the theory of plaintiff, the relation of 
landlord and tenant existed, and that she was 
evicted by the defendant. No force was used. She 
suffered no personal injury, and it is proven she 
recovered eYery article of personal property she 
left in the house. There being no evidence of any 
actual damages, it follows the amount found con-
sisted wholly of punitive or exemplary damages. 
The testimony in the case shows no such willful 
disregard of the rights of plaintiff as would 
authorize the imposition of any considerable ex-
elnplary damages." 
In Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 \Y. Ya. 591, 41 S.E. 2d 
672, the defendant locked the plaintiff out of the apart-
ment for failure to pa:v rent. Two special interrogatories 
were submitted to the jury. The first, ''How nmch do 
you find, if any, as compensatory damages?'' The second, 
''How much do you find, if any, as exen1plary damages J? ' ' 
The jtu~· did not answer the first question and answered 
tlw second question by stating the sum of $1,000. A 
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general verdict was prepared on this special finding and 
signed by the jury foreman. On appeal it was held that 
there could not be an award for punitive damages with-
out an award for compensatory damages. The court 
recognized the general rule that if there was no willful 
eviction the court c;ould not allow damages for mental 
pain and suffering. 
In Michels v. Boruta (Texas), 122 S.W. 2d 216, one 
of the plaintiffs and her former husband recovered a 
judgment of $12.50 each for damages to a tombstone on 
their son's grave, and the wife recovered $800 exemplan· 
damages for mental pain and suffering. The wife had 
not claimed in her complaint any damage arising from 
injury to the tombstone, but, rather, only asked for 
damages for the mental pain and suffering arising from 
the desecration of her child's grave. The jury found that 
the defendant had not acted willfully, but rather, his 
conduct only amounted to negligence. On appeal concern-
ing the awarding of damages, the appellate court stated: 
''As to the question of the right of the appel-
lees to recover as a part of actual damages re-
sulting from trespass or negligence damages for 
injury to feelings-mental pain and anguish-in 
the absence of any other actual dan1ages, :-;erms 
to have been settled by decjsion of the supreme 
court in Gnlf C. & S. F. Hy. Co. v. Trott, 86 rrex., 
412, 25 S.\V. 419, 40 A1n. St. R. 866, that there 
exists no such right of recovery.'' 13 Tex. J ur. 211, 
Sec. 119. 
"It 1nay be regarded as a stated proposition 
)IJ 
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of law that in the absence of actual damages there 
can be no recovery for exemplary damages.'' 
In the present case the only injury suffered by the 
respondent, assun1ing that he was in fact a tenant, was 
the violation of his possessory right to quiet enjoyment 
of his motel unit. Since the court expressly found that 
the appellants had not acted maliciously, and since this 
wrong is one to a property right and no other actual 
damage was found, it was erroneous for the trial court to 
award $250 for mental pain and suffering and 
humiliation. 
III. 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE 
CWSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GRANTED. 
At the close of the plaintiff's case the folowing mo-
tion was made : 
''Defendants move that the complaint be dis-
missed, no cause of action, for the reason that 
there is no showing that the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the defendants was other than 
innkeeper or motel keeper and guest, and for the 
reason that no damage has been shown and that 
the arnount of rent-and it affirmatively appears 
that there is rent owing, and that the clothing is 
held only as a security for the rent. 
"THE COURT: The motion will be denied, 
and you may procePd with presenting your evi-
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dence. We can discuss it at some later time. We 
can discuss in some detail just what this situation 
is. I can either show, as I have shown, it is denied, 
or defer a ruling on it. I'm going into the law 
oorefully after we hear evidence in the case.'' ( Tr. 
69). 
The first part of the motion with regard to the relation 
of the parties hereto has been discussed under point I 
of this argument. The other part of the motion was based 
on the lack of evidence as to damages. The only evidence 
up to this point on the issue of damages was the respond-
ent's testimony, which was as follows: 
'' Q. I said, where did you spend Friday 
night~ 
"A. At n1y mothers. 
'' Q. And what were the conditions there 1 
''A. Y ery crowded; my brother-my mother 
has two small rooms and very crowded and my 
mother and brother were already there. I had to 
sleep on a carpet." (Tr. 58). 
It is submitted that this evidence, without nwre, is in-
sufficient to warrant an award of damages, as is dis-
cussed in Point II, in that the only damage shown would 
be that of inconYenience of sleeping on the floor and 
no showing of actual damage. The fact that this evidence 
was not sufficient to base an award for damages is shown 
quite conclusively by the action of the court at the close 
of the entire case. After both parties had rested and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
had argued the case, the court concluded to find for the 
respondent and recalled the reporter (Tr. 117) and on its 
own motion {Tr. 124) reopened the case to ascertain the 
amount of damages suffered. 
IV. 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED WAS EX-
CESSIVE. 
Assuming for the sake of this argument that the 
first three propositions are found against the appellants, 
the amount of damages awarded is excessive. The 
seventh and eighth findings of fact are as follows: 
'"7. The court finds that the unlawful ac-
tions of the defendant caused the plaintiff to seek 
lodgings elsewhere and that on the 16th day of 
~larch, 1950, the plaintiff :stayed at his mother's 
home and, owing to the crowded conditions there, 
he slept on the floor. 
"8. The court further finds that the unlaw-
ful a;ctions of the defendants caused the plaintiff 
great mental anguish and suffering and that he 
was greatly embarrassed and humiliated, to his 
dan1age in the sun1 of $230.00." 
The respondent's testimony as to his having to sleep on 
the floor has been set out under Point III; just discussed. 
After the case was reopened by the court on its own 
motion and the attorney for the respondent had ques-
tioned him concerning the value of the clothing retained, 
the following testimony was given concerning the dam-
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ages awarded under the finding of fact number eight. 
"MR. FRANK. Is that all, your Honor~ 
"THE COURT. Well, I think perhaps if you 
are interested in this other matter of damages 
that you should ask him about it. 
''MR. BIRD: I object to reopening for that, 
without any showing of plaintiff, but upon the 
court's suggestion; no part of the plaintiff's case. 
''THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
"Q. Mr. Lambert, when you approached 
Mrs. Sine to allow you to get your work clothes, 
can you describe your feelings on that morning? 
''A. It was embarrassing for me to go seek 
lodging in the clothing I was wearing. 
''MR. BIRD : Move that that be stricken as 
a conclusion, state of mind, and not competent 
evidence. 
"THE COURT: :Motion denied. 
"A. \Vhat other-now, what other feelings 
did you have~ 
"THE COURT: Let's ask him now-
,' )JR. FRANK: What 1 
''THE COURT: He said, 'Clothing I was 
wearing'; I have never heard what dothing he 
was wearing. 
''A. A pair of Levi's and aT shirt. 
''THE COURT: Thank you now, go ahead. 
'' :\f H. FRANK: I am confused myself. 
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'· Q. This was-you said you were embar-
rassed when you went where in these-
'' ~-\. \Yhen I went to the hotel to seek lodg-
ing, and, also, when I had to go back and ask Mrs. 
Sine for n1y clothing, I felt-
• • Q. \Yere you uncomfortable without the 
re~t of your clothes-
'' ~rR. BIRD : Objected to as leading and 
suggestive. 
"THE COURT: Objection overruled. 
· · ~rR. BIRD: Calling for a conclusion. 
"Q. -that night~ 
'·A. I felt rather - well, when my girl 
friend asked me-
''THE COURT: Now, just a minute, you 
better answer the questions; don't tell us what 
your girl friend asked you. He said-
• 'Q. Can you describe-
" THE COURT: -during this time when 
you were wearing this T shirt and Levi's that 
night, were you-
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. The next n1orning, now, when you went 
back to get your clothes, your work clothes fro1n 
:\Irs. Sine, how did you feel on that morning~ 
'' ~\IR. BIRD: Object to that as incompetent, 
irrelevant, and imrnaterial. 
•' THE COURT: How he felt may be im-
nlaterial. With respect to this request that you 
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made of Mrs. Sine, what if any reaction did you 
have from that~ 
''A. Mrs. Sine asked me if I needed them. 
I told her I needed the clothes and I felt very 
humiliated to think I had to go back and ask her 
for them. She made me feel rather embarrassed, 
the way she puts things. 
'' Q. And, that night, when you went home, 
back to your mother's house, did you have those 
same feelings at that time~ 
''A. I did, sir. 
'' Q. And you-were you uncomfortable that 
night~ 
''A. I was very uncontfortable. 
"Q. That is the night you slept on the floor? 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And you-what were your feelings m 
connection with that~ 
''A. ~1y mother had friends at the house, 
and, to explain rny be,ing there the way I was, was 
very uncmnfortable. 
'' ~1R. FRANK: Is that sufficient, your 
Honor 0?" ( Tr. 121, 122, 123). 
In the above testimony the respondent indicated that 
he suffered son1e embarrassment because of the clothing 
he was wearing. rrhe respondent testified that he went 
to his apartment on the 15th after getting off from work 
and reruained there approximately 15 minutes (Tr. 53) 
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and then went to hi~ mother's plare in Salt Lake City, 
and after approximately 2% hours returned to his motel 
unit and was unable to get in (Tr. 54). On Tr. 57, line 
6, he testified that he picked up his work clothes next 
morning and had, in addition, the clothes he was wearing. 
It is obvious that he changed into street clothing before 
going to his mother's and that he still had the same street 
clothing at the tin1e he picked up his work clothing. He 
therefore was wearing on the evening of the 16th the 
street clothes being worn by him before the unit was 
locked. These were clothes of his own choice for street 
'\'far. 
As to the inconvenience of having to sleep on the 
floor, it was originally testified that before moving to 
the motel he and his brother lived with his mother at her 
residence on Park Street. (Tr. 14). After the respondent 
was locked out of the motel he again lived with his mother 
and brother at her home on Park Street. Although he 
testified that they only had two small rooms, it would 
appear that for a mother and two boys the embarrass-
ment suffered by the inconvenience of having to stay 
there one night would not support an award of $250.00, 
nor any amount. Especially is this true when the entire 
situation was caused by the respondent's failure to pay 
the rent, which he knew was due and owing. 
In Robinson v. Bonhaye (La. 1940), 195 So. 365, a 
widow sued for wrongful eviction caused h~, the landlord 
taking out the doors and two window sashes during the 
<'old weather. The tenant remained on for two weeks 
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and had a chifferobe placed in front of the door opening, 
which she stated was worth $45.00 and was damaged by 
reason of the use to which it was put. She further testi-
fied that two window shades were damaged, amounting 
to $2.50, and that $2.00 was spent for medicines necessary 
by reason of her having caught cold due to the exposure. 
The court of appeals allowed a judgment of $50.00, in-
cluding the humiliation suffered. 
Bradford v. Mangano (La. 1942), 6 So. 2d 162, was an 
action for wrongful eviction wherein the landlord re-
moved the roof which was said to have caused humilia-
tion and inconvenience to the tenants. The trial court 
awarded $6.00 as actual damage and $10 as other damage, 
making a total judgment of $16. On appeal this amount 
was raised to the sum of $25. 
In Holmes v. DiLeo (La. 1938), 184 So. 356, the door 
was padlocked by the landlord and, although the land-
lord denied locking the same, this issue was found against 
him. Plaintiff claimed that he was out of possession 
25 days and often had to sleep in a chair. The trial court 
awarded $250 and the court of appeals reduced this 
amount to $75. 
In Rammell v. Bulan (Ohio 1948), 80 N.E. 2d 167, 
the tenant was locked out for one evening and the trial 
court allowed daruages in the sum of $1,000. On appeal 
the case was sent back for new trial, the court stating as 
follows: 
''In our opinion, the damages were only nomi-
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nal, for the plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of 
the premises for only one night, which she spent 
with a friend without expense to herself.'' 
If this judgn1ent is allowed to stand, it amounts to 
an invitation to young working boys and college students, 
such as the ones in this case, to rent a motel unit by the 
week and fail to pay their rent, and if any action is taken 
against then1 other than the remedy of unlawful de-
tainer, they rna~· recover substantial damages for the 
slight inconvenience of having to move back with one of 
their parents. To deny the motel keeper the remedy 
of peacefully retaking possession and the right to hold 
personal property as a lien for unpaid rent and then to 
hold him responsible in a substantial amount for the 
slightest type of inconvenience, does not appear to be 
legal, right, or just under the circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the circumstances of this case it cannot be 
held as a matter of law that the respondent and his 
friends had secured an estate and exclusive possession of 
the motel unit occupied by them. The contract was en-
titled, "Guest Registration"; the services performed, 
such as repairing and maintenance, house cleaning serv-
iees, and garbage disposal; the iten1s furnished, such as 
furniture, linens, supplies, water, heat, electricity, and 
tf·lephone; and retention and use of pass keys are all fat-
tors which are inconsistent with any relation of landlord 
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and tenant and can only be justified on the basis of an 
innkeeper and guest relationship. Looking objectively at 
the position of the appellants, it is obvious that they 
should not be relegated to the remedies of a landlord, 
leaving them as a practical matter without an immediate 
and effective remedy. 
At the close of the respondent's case in chief, the 
evidence of damages was not sufficient to permit judicial 
determination by the court. This fact is conclusivelr 
shown since it was necessary for the judge, in computing 
damages, to reopen the case on this issue after both par-
ties had rested. The damage as awarded was for mental 
anguish and humiliation, which cannot he supported in 
the absence of actual damages or malicious conduct 
on the part of appellants, and where the wrong, if any, 
was to a property right. 
The allowance. of $250 for the alleged inconvenience 
to a young man such as the respondent for having to sleep 
on the floor of his mother's home for one night is ex-
tremely excessive. Any actual inconveniencp on the part 
of the respondent would not have arisen if he had lived 
up to his contract and paid his hills when due and owing. 
For himself to he at fault and then seek to hold the ap-
pellants for his alleged embarrassment cannot under the 
facts of this case, be supported. 
The judgment in favor of the respondent should be 
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reversed and judgment entered in favor of the appellants 
with costs in both courts. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD 
DAN S. BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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